Testing the Monopsony-Inefficiency Incentive for Backward Integration

Azzeddine Azzam

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1996, vol. 78, issue 3, 585-590

Abstract: In theory, monopsony at one stage in a vertically related market provides an incentive for backward integration into the adjacent competitive stages. By integrating backward, a monopsonist internalizes the monopsony inefficiency due to underemployment of the factor produced upstream. However, little is known about the importance of such incentive in practice. In this paper I provide an empirically implementable model to test the monopsony-inefficiency incentive for vertical integration. For illustration, the model is applied to the U.S. beef slaughter industry. Findings seem to support the monopsony-inefficiency incentive for backward integration by the industry into the live cattle market. Copyright 1996, Oxford University Press.

Date: 1996
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