An Expected-Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance

Keith Coble, Thomas O. Knight, Rulon D. Pope and Jeffery Williams

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1997, vol. 79, issue 1, 216-226

Abstract: A definition of moral hazard in multiple peril crop insurance is proposed that focuses on expected indemnities rather than input use. Five years of production and insurance data for a panel of Kansas wheat farms is used to empirically test for this type of moral hazard. Results suggest that moral hazard affects multiple peril crop insurance indemnities in poor production years but that no significant moral hazard occurs in years when growing conditions are favorable. Copyright 1997, Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (82)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1243955 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:79:y:1997:i:1:p:216-226

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().