Political Action Committee Contributions and U.S. Congressional Voting on Sugar Legislation

Jonathan C. Brooks, A. Cameron and Colin Carter

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1998, vol. 80, issue 3, 441-454

Abstract: This study examines the simultaneous relationship between Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions and congressional votes on U.S. sugar legislation. We extend the conventional analysis by specifying a three-equation system in which each congressman's vote depends on contributions received from pro-sugar and anti-sugar coalitions, while the propensity of each of these coalitions to contribute depends simultaneously on the congressman's anticipated voting decision and the contributions of the opposing coalition. Logrolling is also accommodated by considering the effect that contributions from other coalitions have had on voting decisions. We find evidence of a three-way linkage between votes and competing campaign contributions and conclude that the effectiveness of PAC contributions reflects the dominance of political pressure over ideological concerns. Copyright 1998, Oxford University Press.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:80:y:1998:i:3:p:441-454

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