Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban
Erwin Bulte () and
Gerrit van Kooten
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1999, vol. 81, issue 2, 453-466
A model of elephant conservation that includes illegal poaching, enforcement effort, and legal culling is used to analyze enforcement and elephant populations for alternative policies, with and without legal trade in ivory. Consistent with previous theoretical models, banning trade may increase or decrease equilibrium stocks. As an empirical application, information for Zambia, along with sensitivity analysis, are used to show that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) than in permitting open trade. However, in all situations, current elephant populations likely exceed optimal levels as perceived by the range states, and further reductions in elephant numbers might be expected. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:81:y:1999:i:2:p:453-466
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