Pleasures of Cockaigne: Quality Gaps, Market Structure, and the Amount of Grading

Sylvette Monier-Dilhan and Hervé Ossard

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1999, vol. 81, issue 3, 501-511

Abstract: The article explores under what circumstances high-quality producers would not voluntarily submit to grading when low-quality firms would readily do so and under what conditions high-quality firms would have a lesser proportion of their output graded than would their low-quality counterparts. It also investigates how market structure affects the decison to grade, establishing that a competitive industry carries out the optimal amount of grading. When some firms have finite market shares, the industry engages in excessive grading. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:81:y:1999:i:3:p:501-511

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