Regulating Broiler Contracts: Tournaments Versus Fixed Performance Standards

Theofanis Tsoulouhas and Tomislav Vukina

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2001, vol. 83, issue 4, 1062-1073

Abstract: Grower discontent with tournaments as mechanisms for settling poultry contracts can largely be attributed to the group composition risk that tournaments impose on growers. This article focuses on the welfare effects of a widely advocated regulatory proposal to prevent integrator companies from using tournaments and replace them with schemes that compare performance to a fixed standard. The analysis shows that the mandatory replacement of tournaments with fixed performance standards, absent any rules that regulate the magnitude of the piece rate, can decrease grower income insurance without raising welfare. However, replacing tournaments with fixed performance standards can simultaneously increase income insurance and welfare, provided that the magnitude of the piece rate is also regulated. Copyright 2001, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2001
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Working Paper: REGULATING BROILER CONTRACTS: TOURNAMENTS VERSUS FIXED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:83:y:2001:i:4:p:1062-1073

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