Taxes and Subsidies in Vertically Related Markets

Marion Desquilbet and Hervé Guyomard

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2002, vol. 84, issue 4, 1033-1041

Abstract: In the framework of a two-country, two-good partial equilibrium model where one of the commodities (the bulk commodity) is an intermediate input in the production of the second good (the processed good), we assume that the government wishes to transfer income to both bulk commodity and processed good producers. Our analysis is concerned with efficient redistribution. The instruments are subsidies or taxes, and there is an opportunity cost of public funds. We use the targeting principle to characterize the set of optimal subsidies or taxes applied on both the bulk commodity and the final good in this vertically related market structure. The theoretical analysis is illustrated using the example of cereals (the bulk commodity) and pork and poultry (the processed good) in the European Union. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-8276.00051 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:84:y:2002:i:4:p:1033-1041

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().