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Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism

Urs Brandt () and Niels Vestergaard ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Lars Gårn Hansen ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2006, vol. 88, issue 4, 974-985

Abstract: To solve the problem of illegal landings this article proposes a new tax mechanism based on the regulator's own aggregate catch estimates and ex ante self-reports of planned catch by fishermen. We show that the mechanism avoids illegal landings while ensuring (nearly) optimal exploitation and generating (nearly) correct entry and exit incentives. Finally we simulate the mechanism for the Danish cod fishery in Kattegat to obtain a rough indicator of the size of the tax. It turns out that the average tax payment as a percentage of profit is surprisingly low. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2006
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American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:88:y:2006:i:4:p:974-985