A Political Economic Analysis of U.S. Rice Export Programs to Japan and South Korea: A Game Theoretic Approach

Dae-Seob Lee and P. Lynn Kennedy

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2007, vol. 89, issue 1, 104-115

Abstract: The Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture (UR) has contributed to the increase in U.S. and world rice trade since 1994. Despite this, the Japanese and Korean rice markets continue to be characterized by high levels of trade intervention. This paper attempts to analyze both import markets incorporating econometric estimates and public choice theory in a game theoretic framework. Various scenarios are analyzed. The results show that the overall Nash equilibrium occurs with a 4% tariff reduction for Japan and Korea under the U.S. Market Development Program, which includes the Market Access Program and Foreign Market Development Program. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:89:y:2007:i:1:p:104-115

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