The Matching Problem (and Inventories) in Private Negotiation

Christopher T. Bastian and Lance B. Gittings

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2007, vol. 89, issue 4, 1073-1084

Abstract: This study examines laboratory market outcomes under alternative matching risk scenarios and advance production. Limited access and/or asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers cause a matching problem. When sellers hold inventory before sale and there is buyer concentration, prices are about 23% below the competitive level and close to the predicted monopsony price. The bargaining advantage shifts to buyers in this market environment. Sellers can benefit by creating alliances or cooperatives to increase their bargaining position for price and overcome poor access to buyers. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2007
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