Inventories and Public Information in Private Negotiation: A Laboratory Market Study

Dale J. Menkhaus, Owen R. Phillips and Alla V. Yakunina

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2007, vol. 91, issue 2, 503-517

Abstract: Using laboratory markets, this research investigates the impacts of reporting different kinds of aggregated trade information to buyers and sellers who conduct transactions through bilateral/private negotiation. There are a limited number of bargaining rounds or matches between buyer and seller pairs. Sellers hold a perishable inventory before negotiations begin. We find that knowledge of trades, along with price, improves the coordination and bargaining position of buyers. Trade prices are lower and buyer earnings are higher, relative to the no-information treatment or when just-past quantities or just-past prices are reported. Market efficiency declines as public information is reported. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2007
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