On the Collapse of Historical Civilizations

David H. Good and Rafael Reuveny

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2009, vol. 91, issue 4, 863-879

Abstract: To explain the collapse of historical civilizations, scholars typically point to suboptimal behaviors including misunderstanding the natural environment, shortsightedness, or a lack of institutions. We examine the collapse of four historical societies with a model of endogenous population growth and renewable resources employing components of optimal resource management, economic growth theory, and the moral philosophy of social welfare function choice. We find that these collapses may have been socially optimal. Further, we show that the transient behavior of the system is more sensitive to assumptions than the equilibrium behavior and that focusing solely on equilibria may miss key insights. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:91:y:2009:i:4:p:863-879

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