Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions

Steven Wu ()

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2010, vol. 92, issue 1, 28-41

Abstract: This study models producer protection legislation (PPL) that would grant growers the right to claim damages if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, producer protection legislation damages (PPLD) would not be distortionary or redistributive. If contracting frictions exist, then PPLD would have efficiency and redistributive effects, though the direction and magnitude depends on the size of PPL damages vis-à-vis expected damages under existing contract law. This study clarifies the conditions under which PPLD would decrease efficiency and protect growers. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aap017 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:92:y:2010:i:1:p:28-41

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().