Changes in Beef Packers' Market Power after the Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act: An Agent-based Auction

Christopher Boyer and B Brorsen

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2013, vol. 95, issue 4, 859-876

Abstract: Controversy remains about the effectiveness of the 1999 Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act (MPRA). We determine the likely changes in beef packers' market power after the MPRA by using an agent-based, first-price common-value auction. Past research has employed Cournot models, but we use an auction model, which more closely resembles the actual cattle procurement process. We find that feeders benefit from the MPRA regardless of whether price uncertainty decreases for packers and/or feeders. If the packers' price uncertainty is reduced, the feeder benefits from an increase in competition between the packers. If the feeder's price uncertainty is reduced, the feeder benefits from imposing more accurate reserve prices. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aat005 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:95:y:2013:i:4:p:859-876

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().