Counterproductive Counternarcotic Strategies?

Camilla I.M. Andersson

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2013, vol. 95, issue 4, 917-931

Abstract: We model the economic incentives surrounding opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Specifically, we examine the impact of eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, and when the crops are cultivated in sharecropping arrangements. The analysis suggests that when perfect credit markets are available, an increased risk of eradication will lead to less land being allocated to opium poppy. However, when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, an eradication policy can rather increase land under poppy cultivation. Furthermore, the unintended effects of eradication can be augmented in sharecropping arrangements. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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