Property Rights and Choice: The Case of the Fishery

Jorge Holzer

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2015, vol. 97, issue 4, 1175-1191

Abstract: Formal property rights are typically established after considerable waste has occurred, despite the effectiveness of such schemes in addressing the inefficiencies of common pool resources. Adoption can be contentious because of the assignment of wealth and political influence that accompany the transition to exclusive property rights. This paper studies how the early involvement of harvesters in policy implementation designed to address the commons’ inefficiency may foster perceived legitimacy and lessen political opposition to the establishment of individual property rights. We demonstrate that it is optimal for a manager facing industry strife and reform delay to allow firms to self-select into the property rights regime. The strategic interaction of harvesters leads to an equilibrium characterized by the global adoption of property rights. Thus, by providing harvesters with a choice between management systems, policy makers can reduce the transaction costs associated with the need to create political consensus, while ensuring an outcome similar to the top-down implementation of market-based management. Evidence is provided from a recent policy change in Maryland fisheries in which the provision of a choice resulted in the overwhelming adoption of individual transferable quotas and the end of the race to fish.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ajae/aau117 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:97:y:2015:i:4:p:1175-1191.

Access Statistics for this article

American Journal of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Madhu Khanna, Brian E. Roe, James Vercammen and JunJie Wu

More articles in American Journal of Agricultural Economics from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().