Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment

Marc Conte () and Robert M. Griffin

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2017, vol. 99, issue 3, 571-591

Abstract: Procuring agencies in conservation auctions typically have more information about the ecosystem service (ES) quality of conservation actions than landowners and can affect auction outcomes by controlling participants’ access to this information. Our induced-value laboratory auction experiment explores the impact of sellers’ access to ES-quality information on auction efficiency when the conservation action choice is endogenous to offer formation. We find that providing ES-quality information allows sellers to identify and submit higher-quality conservation actions, an effect that counteracts previously identified efficiency losses from information rents.

Keywords: Ecosystem services; information asymmetry; laboratory experiment; procurement auctions; quality auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 Q15 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:99:y:2017:i:3:p:571-591.

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