The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations: An Experiment

Christoph Engel and Michael Kurschilgen

American Law and Economics Review, 2013, vol. 15, issue 2, 578-609

Abstract: In this paper, we test the effect of normative expectations and legal framing on cooperation in an experimental public good game with and without sanctions. We show that cooperation increases substantially as normative expectations and behavioral patterns coevolve. In the absence of sanctions, legal framing does not have any additional beneficial effect in realigning individual action and social well-being. Yet, in the presence of sanctions, the legal frame is crucial for the effectiveness of sanctions. Law and sanctions seem to complement each other. Our results inform the legal debate on customary law. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/aht010 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:15:y:2013:i:2:p:578-609

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

American Law and Economics Review is currently edited by J.J. Prescott and Albert Choi

More articles in American Law and Economics Review from American Law and Economics Association Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().