An Empirical Analysis of the Signaling and Screening Models of Litigation

Paul Pecorino () and Mark Van Boening

American Law and Economics Review, 2018, vol. 20, issue 1, 214-244

Abstract: We present an experimental analysis of the signaling and screening models of litigation. In both models, bargaining failure is driven by asymmetric information. The difference between the models lies in the bargaining structure: In the signaling game, the informed party makes the final offer, while in the screening game the uninformed party makes the final offer. We conduct experiments for both models under a common set of parameter values, allowing only the identity of the party making the final offer to change. We find the anomalous behavior to be more common in the signaling game, but the frequency of this behavior diminishes in the later rounds of the experiment. Across both games, in the later rounds of the experiment over 90% of offers are consistent with the theory. Having the right to make the offer raises a player’s expected payoffs, but by much less than is predicted by theory. Dispute rates across the two games are approximately equal.

Date: 2018
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