Vulnerability and reliable signaling in conflicts between hermit crabs

Mark E. Laidre

Behavioral Ecology, 2007, vol. 18, issue 4, 736-741

Abstract: When interacting organisms have opposing genetic interests, the integrity of communication systems may be undermined. For signaling in such conflict circumstances to remain evolutionarily stable, cheaters must be handicapped. Agonistic threat signals, however, are not always constrained or costly to produce, and yet these signals occur in the severest of conflicts where strong incentives exist for dishonesty. A leading hypothesis for how reliability is stabilized under these conditions is that signaling entails a risk, making signalers vulnerable to injury. Here I experimentally alter vulnerability to show how risk can modify organisms' willingness to escalate disputes, affecting the use of threat signals. The vulnerability to injury of hermit crabs (Pagurus bernhardus) was manipulated by varying the exposure of their soft uncalcified abdomens. When faced with potentially damaging conspecific attacks, more vulnerable crabs were conflict averse, showing reluctance to claim ownership over contestable food, frequently retreating from threats, and refraining from threatening others. The risk an organism can bear in escalated conflict can thus mediate its agonistic behavior and usage of threats. Postural nuances can consequently provide reliable information about aggressive intentions despite minimal production costs and opposing interests between communication parties. Copyright 2007, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2007
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