The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation

Robert Wade

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1987, vol. 11, issue 2, 95-106

Abstract: When will villagers cooperate to supply themselves with goods and services that they all need but could not provide for thems elves individually? When will those who face a potential "tragedy of the commons" organize a system of rules by which the tragedy is averted? Many writers are pessimistic about the chances of such coop eration, some favoring privatization, others favoring state control. This paper shows that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak in many situations of village-based common property resource use. It then suggests a number of factors on which the chances of successful collective action depend. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1987
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