The Anatomy of Corporate Control: Directors, Shareholders and Executive Remuneration in Giant U.S. and U.K. Corporations

A D Cosh and Alan Hughes

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1987, vol. 11, issue 4, 285-313

Abstract: This paper provides a contemporary comparison of the anatomy of corporate contol in giant U.S. and U.K. corporations. The comparison draws upon an analysis of share ownership, executive remuneration, board membership, and the patterns of interlocking directorships. The results are of significance not only for the managerialist hypothesis, but also for the wider issues concerning the control and behavior of these giant corporations. The evidence presented leads to some qualifications of the managerialist position. Furthermore, the study identifies the potentially key role played by nonexecutiv e directors, particularly where their board membership is associated with significant shareholdings of financial institutions. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1987
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