Price Regulation in Hungary, 1968-87: A Behavioural-Institutional Explanation

Wim Swaan

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1990, vol. 14, issue 3, 247-65

Abstract: Although the official goals with regard to price formation have become increasingly market-oriented in Hungary, the price system itself has retained a bureaucratic character. After the transfer of tasks from the branch ministries, the behavior of the Price Office is characterized by a mixture of branch-defending indulgence and unhesitating strictness. The capture theory of regulation may provide some explanation, but not a complete one. Comprehensive bureaucratic control is reinforced at least as much by other factors: it goes with a soft budget constraint and requires a monopolistic market structure, which in turn increase the need for intervention. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1990
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