Corporatism, Profit Squeeze and Investment

Andrew Henley and Euclid Tsakalotos

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1991, vol. 15, issue 4, 425-50

Abstract: This paper argues that the mainstream literature on corporatism focuses too narrowly on the relationship between corporatism and the labor market. It adopts a broader political economy perspective to argue that corporatist arrangements impart macroeconomic stability through the resolution of distributional conflict and through greater investment stability. Results for nineteen OECD economies are presented that demonstrate that economies with strong corporatist institutions have enjoyed much greater success in forestalling the profit squeeze of the 1970s and early 1980s. Further results also demonstrate that investment in such economies is more stable and resilient to movements in profitability. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1991
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:15:y:1991:i:4:p:425-50

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue

More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().