Property Rights and the Agency Problem in China's Enterprise Reform

Keun Lee ()

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 17, issue 2, 179-94

Abstract: This paper analyzes problems in China's enterprise reform from property rights and agency problem perspectives. Reform efforts by the mid 1980s are interpreted as dealing with only the agency problem by relocating the decision process among agents, but not solving the hierarchical collusion problem. The shareholding system experiment is the first effort to deal with property rights relations. Although it seems to have contributed to some improvement in enterprise performance, there still remains the problem of expropriation of state assets by agents seeking irregular private gains. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1993
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