Bargaining Power, Mark-Up Power, and Wage Differentials in Brazil

Edward J Amadeo

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1994, vol. 18, issue 3, 313-22

Abstract: This paper looks at institutions and economic structures affecting the formation of wages and prices in Brazil. In particular, the author examines the role of collective bargaining and rent-sharing between firms and workers. These are important elements in explaining two characteristics of the recent inflationary experience in Brazil, namely, the overindexation of wages with respect to past inflation and the positive correlation between the bargaining power of unions and mark-up power of firms. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1994
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