Contracts and Competition: An Introduction

Simon Deakin and Jonathan Michie

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 21, issue 2, 121-25

Abstract: Changes in public policy and corporate strategy have enhanced the role of contracts as mechanisms of economic governance. The understanding that norms, standards, and other forms of regulatory mechanism can affect the structure of incentives and the quality of contractual outcomes has helped to stimulate a wider debate concerning institutions and economic performance. Among the themes explored in this special issue, which draws on the U.K. ESRC's Contracts and Competition Programme, are the need for interdisciplinary analysis of economic organization, the link between contracts and trust, and the complex relationship between institutional forms and economic outcomes. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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