 Transaction Cost Economics and Contractual RelationsMaria E Maher Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 21, issue 2, 147-70 Abstract: One of the key factors in the study of transaction costs economics is the concept of opportunism. Williamson (1986) develops a heuristic model of transaction costs and governance structures in which the critical dimensions, with respect to which transaction costs differ, are identified: the frequency of exchange, the degree of relationship-specific investment, and uncertainty. This work examines whether there is empirical support for Williamson's model. Firms in four different industries were interviewed about their contractual relationships with their customers or suppliers. The degree of transaction costs differs both across industries and across firms within an industry. Although the author finds that there is strong support for the Williamson (1986) model, a critical dimension omitted from this model is market structure. By affecting the risks of opportunism, she finds that market structure also has important consequences for the nature of contractual relations governing firms' transactions. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1997 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:21:y:1997:i:2:p:147-70 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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