 Public ChoiceLionel Orchard and Hugh Stretton Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1997, vol. 21, issue 3, 409-30 Abstract: The distinctive elements of public choice theory were published by Americans between 1949 and 1971. Most later writing has applied, modified or retreated from the original structure of theory. Partly because of the qualities which it combines and partly because its practitioners combine them in different proportions, the theory can be characterized as: (i) another attempt at a rigorous, axiomatic general theory of government; (ii) a vision of politics as a marketplace for individual exchanges, best understood by the use of neoclassical economic theory; or (iii) a selective analysis of political activity designed to discredit government and persuade people to reduce its scope. Most of the theorists explain most political behavior as motivated mainly or solely by individual material self-interest. This paper reviews the effects of that on public choice analyses of voters', politicians', bureaucrats', judges' and other gain-seekers' behavior, and on the theorists' proposals for reform. It concludes with some assessments of the work, and speculation about its prospects. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1997 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:21:y:1997:i:3:p:409-30 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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