 The Political Economy of 'Policy Credibility': The New-Classical Macroeconomics and the Remaking of Emerging EconomiesIlene Grabel Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 24, issue 1, 1-19 Abstract: The criterion of "policy credibility" is invoked with increasing frequency today by new-classical development economists in debates over economic and institutional reform in developing and transitional countries. The paper argues that the credibility criterion is used to privilege neoliberal economic policies and associated institutions. The paper demonstrates that the credibility criterion is theoretically anti-pluralist and politically anti-democratic. In this connection, the paper argues that a policy's credibility is always secured endogenously through political and economic power rather than exogenously by virtue of the epistemiological status of the theory that promotes it. The paper concludes by suggesting two alternative criteria by which policy regimes and the governance structure of monetary institutions could be adjudicated. These alternative criteria are termed the "principle of democratic credibility" and the "principle of fallibility". Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press. Date: 2000 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:24:y:2000:i:1:p:1-19 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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