 The Status of Economics as a Naturalistic Social ScienceClive Beed and Cara Beed Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 24, issue 4, 417-35 Abstract: Naturalistic social science is held frequently to be the most effective means of discovering social reality (e.g., Kincaid, H. 1996; McIntyre, L. 1996). This paper evaluates economics as such a science. From Kincaid, criteria for naturalism in social science are identified. The focus here is whether rational, objective empirical methods exist for choosing economic theories; whether fair, cross and independent tests exist for theories, assumptions and methodological norms; and whether economic theories chosen in these ways have public policy relevance. Examples from economics are related to each of these naturalistic criteria. These encompass the relevance of econometrics to testing economic theories, the complications the non-natural-kind quality of economic variables impose on testing, and the question of whether naturalistic methods reveal economic reality. The paper concludes that the practice of economics does not, and is not able to, rely on naturalistic methods. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press. Date: 2000 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:24:y:2000:i:4:p:417-35 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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