The evolutionary firm and Cournot's Dilemma

Neil B. Niman

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2004, vol. 28, issue 2, 273-289

Abstract: Recently, competence/capability has been introduced as a rival and as a complement to the idea of transaction-costs as the foundation for a modern theory of the firm. However, while the competence-based approach may be inspired by evolutionary economics, it does not, in its current form, provide an evolutionary theory of the firm. To transform this competence-based approach into an evolutionary theory, the connection between the firm and Veblen's concept of social knowledge is more fully developed. Once established, the evolutionary theory of the firm is utilised to bypass Marshall's reconciliation problem and solve Cournot's Dilemma. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2004
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