Fiscal federalism in Russia: a critique of the OECD proposals

Steven Rosefielde and Natalia Vennikova

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2004, vol. 28, issue 2, 307-318

Abstract: The OECD proposes to kill two birds with one stone in Russia by simultaneously improving fiscal federalism, and using the financial reform process to press for full market liberalisation. This paper scrutinises the initiative and finds it wanting because the consensus reforms advocated conflate the re-centralisation of fiscal authority with optimal ownership, property rights and effective market building, perpetuating the illusion that there are no bad market systems. The G-7 and Putin must do better. Yeltsin's mis-privatisation and mis-liberalisation, which spawned rent seeking, asset stripping, asset seizing and a disregard for profit maximising from current operations, have proved to be path dependent and need to be rectified. Putin's increasingly visible efforts to rein private property rights must also be taken into account in designing on optimal fiscal federalist regime. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2004
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