Naturalised epistemology and economics

Clive Beed

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 29, issue 1, 99-117

Abstract: The relevance to economics of naturalised epistemology (also known as the naturalistic turn) from philosophy of science has recently been argued by economic methodologists, especially by D. Wade Hands (Reflection Without Rules: Economic Methodology and Contemporary Science Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001). This concept is held by Hands to constitute part of the 'new economic methodology' that consists of the 'interpenetration of economics and science theory'. Contrary to Hands's case, naturalised epistemology is shown here not to represent a qualitatively new concept, to possess little coherent meaning, and to be incapable of charting an innovative way forward for economics. Although there are more issues concerning naturalism bearing on economics than are noted by Hands, three specific limitations of naturalised epistemology are discussed. These and other limitations are related to the economics examples Hands proposes suggesting the usefulness of naturalised epistemology for economics. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cje/bei013 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:29:y:2005:i:1:p:99-117

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue

More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().