Post-Keynesianism, socialisation of investment and Swedish wage-earner funds

Philip Whyman

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2006, vol. 30, issue 1, 49-68

Abstract: This paper analyses the performance of one of the most controversial of recent economic policy 'experiments', namely Swedish Wage-earner Funds (WEFs). It examines the ability of the WEFs to meet macroeconomic, financial and democratic objectives. The analysis indicates a favourable financial performance, but little significant democratisation. Macroeconomic influence was constrained by the limited size of the scheme and, though associated with positive changes in economic variables, the experiment was ultimately overwhelmed by the collapse of an asset price 'bubble'. Nevertheless, the performance of the WEFs has legitimised the concept of collective investment funds as an economic policy instrument. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2006
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