Two conceptions of economics and maximisation

Crespo, Ricardo

Two conceptions of economics and maximisation

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2013, vol. 37, issue 4, 759-774

Abstract: Economics has evolved from a 'domain-focused' conception, i.e. the study of specific kinds of human activities, to a 'scarcity-based' conception, i.e. the study of a particular approach to all human choices. It thus enlarged its domain and narrowed its perspective: instrumental maximising. This paper maintains that economics should be domain focused, with a core of scarcity-based analysis of its domain, integrated into a broader analysis. It also holds that the scarcity-based analysis of realities falling outside the economic domain is not economics, but rather a social science broader in respect to the field but narrower in respect to the analysis, and thus partial in its conclusions. Section 2 introduces these versions of economics, Section 3 links them to specific conceptions of rationality, Section 4 provides arguments for the paper's thesis and Section 5 deals with two related versions of maximisation and argues for adopting one of them. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cje/bes076 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cambje:v:37:y:2013:i:4:p:759-774

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Cambridge Journal of Economics is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue

More articles in Cambridge Journal of Economics from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().