Let’s agree not to agree: F. A. Hayek’s ‘calculus of consent’

Régis Servant

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2017, vol. 41, issue 1, 259-281

Abstract: Our paper aims to show that one of Hayek’s arguments in support of free-market capitalism - and against centralized planning, a regime of distributive justice and a bargaining democracy - rests on the contractarian criterion of voluntary agreement or voluntary consent. According to Hayek, people can reach consensual agreement on the desirability of a regime, free-market capitalism, whose operation necessarily produces nonconsensual results.

Keywords: Hayek; Contractarianism; Agreement; Consent; Rules; Constitution; Buchanan and Tulloch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B3 B4 B5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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