Two-sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries

Bruno Jullien

CESifo Economic Studies, 2005, vol. 51, issue 2-3, 233-260

Abstract: The object of this paper is to discuss intermediation on-line from the perspective of two-sided markets. It builds a simple model of the intermediation activity when trading partners are involved into a commercial relationship and uses it to illustrate some of the results that emerge in the two-sided market literature, as well as to discuss some new aspects. The first part concentrates on a monopoly intermediation service and discusses both efficient pricing and monopoly pricing. The second part discusses the nature of competition between intermediaries, addressing issues such as competitive cross-subsidies, multi-homing or tying. (JEL D4, D85, L40, L12, L13, L14)

Date: 2005
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