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How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design *

Alessandro Cigno

CESifo Economic Studies, 2010, vol. 56, issue 1, 21-37

Abstract: Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect, which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The article outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing. (JEL codes: D13, D64, H55, J13, J14 and J26) Copyright The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design (2009) Downloads
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