How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design

Alessandro Cigno

No 2590, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The paper outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing.

Keywords: pension reform; implicit pension taxes and subsidies; child benefits; fertility; labour productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D64 H55 J13 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design * (2010)
Working Paper: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design (2009)
Working Paper: How to avoid a pension crisis: A question of intelligent system design (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2590

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