How to avoid a pension crisis: A question of intelligent system design
Alessandro Cigno
CHILD Working Papers from CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY
Abstract:
Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The paper outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing.
Keywords: Pension reform; implicit pension taxes and subsidies; child benefits; fertility; labour productivity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 D64 H55 J13 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2009-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design * (2010) 
Working Paper: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design (2009) 
Working Paper: How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp04_09
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