 Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation *CESifo Economic Studies, 2011, vol. 57, issue 2, 216-244 Abstract: Does joint taxation disadvantage women? To answer that question, this article begins by reviewing bargaining models of intrafamily allocation and discussing the determinants of 'bargaining power'. It argues that wage rates rather than earnings are determinants of bargaining power, and that productivity in household production is also a determinant of bargaining power. In the absence of human capital effects, joint taxation does not appear to disadvantage women in bargaining. Hence, the claim that joint taxation disadvantages women, if correct, depends on effects that operate through incentives to accumulate human capital. But a satisfactory analysis of the effects of taxation on human capital awaits the further development of dynamic models of family bargaining. (JEL codes: H21, H24, D13, J22) Copyright The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com, Oxford University Press. Date: 2011 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:57:y:2011:i:2:p:216-244 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article CESifo Economic Studies is currently edited by Panu Poutvaara More articles in CESifo Economic Studies from CESifo Group Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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