Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation

Robert Pollak

No 3109, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Does joint taxation disadvantage women? To answer that question, this paper begins by reviewing unitary and bargaining models of intrafamily allocation, and then discusses the determinants of "bargaining power" in a world without taxes. It argues that wage rates rather than earnings are determinants of bargaining power, and then argues that productivity in household production is also a source of bargaining power. In the absence of human capital effects, joint taxation does not appear to disadvantage women in either divorce threat or separate spheres bargaining. Hence, the claim that joint taxation disadvantages women, if it is correct, depends on effects that operate through the incentives to accumulate human capital. But a satisfactory analysis of the effects of taxation on human capital awaits the further development of dynamic models of family bargaining.

Keywords: household production; family bargaining; joint taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H21 H24 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published - published in: CESifo Economic Studies, 2011, 57 (2), 216-244

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Journal Article: Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation * (2011)
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