 SATISFICING AND SEQUENTIAL TARGETS IN ECONOMIC POLICY: A POLITICO-ECONOMIC APPROACHContributions to Political Economy, 2004, vol. 23, issue 1, 49-64 Abstract: The standard optimising framework has difficulties in explaining macroeconomic policy phenomena in some countries, such as long-term spiralling public debts and sequential setting of policy targets. Moreover, it has not responded convincingly to some common criticisms, such as the question of symmetry, and the failure to account for the existence of policy-lobbying groups. This paper suggests that a satisficing approach to economic policy is a possible way of accommodating all the above. This approach combined with priority target setting has been used in other social sciences. It concentrates on the concepts of sequential attention to policy objectives and 'satisfactory' macroeconomic targets. It also provides a choice theoretical framework as a foundation of the satisficing approach to economic policy. A simple example of a satisficing sequential target model is presented. There is also an attempt to link other alternative approaches, such as politico-economic models, with this framework. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press. Date: 2004 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:copoec:v:23:y:2004:i:1:p:49-64 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Contributions to Political Economy is currently edited by Jacqui Lagrue More articles in Contributions to Political Economy from Cambridge Political Economy Society Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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