Antitrust and Competition, Historically Considered

Thomas J DiLorenzo and Jack C High

Economic Inquiry, 1988, vol. 26, issue 3, 423-35

Abstract: Although antitrust laws enjoy wide support among economists, there was almost no such support during the early years of the Sherman Act. One reason for this transformation is a change in the theory of comp etition. Until the 1920s, most economists viewed competition as a dynamic, rivalrous process that would be stifled by antitrust laws. Once the perfect competition model-which largely ignores rivalry was accepted, economists' opinions of antitrust grew more favorable. To the extent that antitrust interferes with rivalry and enterprise, the competitive model has very likely misdirected the profession, at least as far as antitrust policy is concerned. Copyright 1988 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1988
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