Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat

Ronald N Johnson and Gary Libecap

Economic Inquiry, 1989, vol. 27, issue 3, 431-51

Abstract: In contrast to numerous assertions in the literature on bureaucratic behavior that government employees seek to promote the growth of their agencies to increase their salaries, this paper offers empirical evidence indicating the absence of a significant positive relationship between agency growth and salaries. The impact of agency growth on salaries is estimated using a random sample of individual federal white-collar employees. Inspection of civil service rules reveals that most federal employees are highly insulated from fluctuations in agency staffing or budget appropriations. The existence of a highly protected bureaucracy raises questions about the control and performance of federal workers. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1989
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