An Equilibrium Politico-Economic Model

Christopher J Ellis

Economic Inquiry, 1989, vol. 27, issue 3, 521-28

Abstract: A politico-economic model is developed in which rationally-formed forecasts are available to all traders. Systematic government policy is neutral, but a large majority of the electorate, those who adopt rationally formed forecasts, but do not know the model, hold the government responsible for the economy's performance. Real and political shocks generate novel feedback effects due to anticipated regime changes. These feedback effects may amplify or dampen the initial shocks; this depends on whether the government follows a high or low monetary growth rate rule and whether inflation or unemployment is the main concern of the electorate. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:27:y:1989:i:3:p:521-28

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().