The Influence of Ideology on Congressional Voting

Bruce Bender

Economic Inquiry, 1991, vol. 29, issue 3, 416-28

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of ideology on congressional voting. The conceptual framework is based on the assumption that the congressman's objective is the maximization of the expected value of his office. A comparative analysis of voting on two proposed floor amendments to the U.S. House Administration Committee's 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act bill indicates that congressman will ignore ideological considerations when the opportunity cost of not ignoring them is sufficiently high. Voting on one of these amendments is found to be consistent with shirking as broadly defined. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1991
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