Economics at your fingertips  

Industry Income and Congressional Regulatory Legislation: Interest Groups vs. Median Voter

Steven F Cahan and William Kaempfer ()

Economic Inquiry, 1992, vol. 30, issue 1, 47-56

Abstract: Interest group theories of regulation suggest that industries will be able to gain political benefits at the expense of the larger, but disorganized and disinterested, general public. However, casual observation indicates that industries are often the targets of costly legislation. The authors examine how the political influence and vulnerability of industries are affected by industry income. Results show wealthy industries are more likely to be subject to costly legislation, whereas no relationship was found between industry income and the granting of political benefits. They interpret these results as supportive of both interest group and median voter models of the political process. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

Page updated 2020-03-29
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:1:p:47-56