An Analytic History of Delivered Price Litigation: Do Courts Properly Distinguish Rivalrous from Collusive Instances?

Christian G Cabou, David D Haddock and Michele H Thorne

Economic Inquiry, 1992, vol. 30, issue 2, 307-21

Abstract: The federal judiciary's present, cautious approach to delivered pricing is appropriate. Using court records and recent contributions to the economic literature, this article evaluates the antitrust history of those practices. Delivered pricing can replace mill pricing naturally in some rivalrous settings but, under special circumstances, could be collusive. Thus, delivered pricing has sometimes been adjudged a Sherman Act violation but only given other evidence of collusion. For a time, however, the legal system threatened to treat delivered pricing as per se violation of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. That reflected poor economic understanding. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1992
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